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Abstract
This Article argues that the initiatives adopted in order to make parastatals more efficient are
inadequate and will not realize the intended objectives unless the chief executives of parastatals
are hired on a competitive basis, given more autonomy and the government is committed not only
to designing performance contracts that set realistic standards, but also enforcing them strictly.
It also contends that there is a need to streamline the multiple regulations that govern parastatals
and reform the corporate regulatory framework of the private sector in order to raise standards of
corporate governance and, as a result, ensure that the privatized services are managed prudently.
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INTRODUCTION
Parastatals' are deeply implicated in most fiscal problems of
African governments because of their inefficiency, losses, budg-
etary burdens, and provision of poor products and services.2 Oc-
casionally, they achieve some non-commercial objectives, which
are used to justify their poor economic performance.' Due to
the economic crisis facing Kenya since the mid 1970s, 4 the coun-
try has been dependent on financial assistance from the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund ("IMF").5 To resolve
* Lecturer in Law at Queen's University Belfast. I am grateful to Professor Andrew
Keay, Dr. Peter Walton, and Dr. Edwin Abuya for their comments on an earlier draft of
this Article. Responsibility for any errors or omissions lies with the author.
1. Parastatals are statutorily authorized corporate entities which earn their revenue
from the sale of goods and services and in which the government holds a majority of
shares. See The State Corporations Act, (1986) Cap. 446 § 2. (Kenya). They are also
referred to as State Owned Enterprises. See, e.g., SRI INT'L, PARASTATALS IN KENYA: AS-
SESSMENT OF THEIR IMPACT AND AN ACTION PLAN FOR REFORM: FINAL REPORT PREPARED
FOR KENYA ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS 1 (1992).
2. African governments are keen to privatize parastatals because of the losses re-
sulting from their inefficiency. By 1997, the World Bank had documented more than
2700 privatizations in Africa. See Leon Louw, Making Privatization Work in South Africa, 2
ECON. REFORM TODAY 24-25 (1999), available at http://www.cipe.org/publications/ert/
e32/e32_7.pdf.
3. SeeJohn Nellis, Public Enterprises in Sub-Saharan Africa, in BARBARA GROSH, PUBLIC
ENTERPRISE IN KENYA: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T, AND WHY 7 (1991).
4. Despite the government's massive investment in the parastatal enterprises, the
Treasury received only UKY2.2 million as dividends between 1978 and 1979. Although
the government had invested in more than 300 enterprises, this amount was paid by
only six enterprises. See REP. OF KENYA, THE 1982 WORKING PARTY ON GOVERNMENT AND
EXPENDITURE 40-41 (1982).
5. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") are the most
influential donor agencies in Kenya. The IMF's relationship with Kenya started when it
lent the country funds to purchase the land occupied by colonial settlers in order to
resettle Africans. Attempts to initiate policy reforms by the agencies have not been
successful. For instance, the liberalization of the agricultural sector has led to the de-
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the economic crisis facing the country, these two lending agen-
cies, in 1980, successfully urged the Kenyan government to
adopt structural adjustment programs, which would reduce gov-
ernment participation in productive activities.6 Although the
government agreed to reduce its participation in the economy,
some government intervention was deemed necessary for the
purposes of guiding appropriate development of the country.
The intervention was preferred in order to ensure a stable, con-
ducive economic environment for private sector activities and to
provide administrative and social services, such as health and
water, which the private sector could not readily offer.7 The in-
ternational lending agencies were also keen to advocate the
privatization of parastatals in order to enhance their efficiency.8
In spite of the pressure on the Kenyan government to privatize
them in order to improve their productivity, the change of gov-
ernment in 2002 and the better provision of public services have
given rise to the possibility of improving the performance of
parastatals without privatizing all their services.9 While the con-
ditions imposed in the past by the donors might have been justi-
fied because there was no other means of redeeming parastatals
from mismanagement, the current government feels that donors
need to change their stance given that the new administration is
committed to economic reforms and is not as marred by corrup-
tion as the former. Rather than divesting its entire stake in para-
statals, the government has sought to privatize some selected ser-
vices and give priority to local investors rather than foreign
ones. ° To do so, it has enacted the Privatization Act of 2005
cline of the sector, as Kenya's produce has not competed effectively with foreign pro-
duce. See Matin J. Keng'ore, Why We Should be Wary of the World Bank, IMF, E. APR. STAN-
DARD (Kenya), Oct. 1, 2001, at 7.
6. The structural adjustment program was meant to enhance the role of the pri-
vate sector and market forces, reduce government expenditure and its level of partici-
pation in the economy, further budget austerity, liberalize both domestic and external
trade, and reform exchange rate management. See SRI INT'L, supra note 1, at 10.
7. See REp. OF KENYA, supra note 4, at 42.
8. See SRI INT'L, supra note 1, at 9.
9. The current National Rainbow Coalition ("NARC") Government came into
power in December 2002 after defeating the Kenya African National Union ("KANU")
Party. See New Kenyan President Vows to Deliver on Economic Promises, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
2003, at A15.
10. See Muna Wahome, World Bank Goes Easy on Privatization, DAILY NATION (Ke-
nya), Feb. 18, 2003; see also Tread Softly on Parastatals, DAILY NATION (Kenya), June 20,
2003; Go Slow on Privatization, DAILY NATION (Kenya), June 19, 2003.
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which, among other targets, seeks to involve the private sector in
order to improve the infrastructure and the delivery of public
services. I' It has also entered into performance contracts with
directors of parastatals whereby they have promised to achieve
set targets within a particular period and the government has
increased their remuneration and promised to award a bonus
when the targets are met or to replace them when they are not.
It is against this background that this Article assesses the ef-
fectiveness of the measures that have been initiated in order to
improve the productivity of parastatals. An examination of their
development, effect on the economy, and reasons for their poor
performance will shed light on the adequacy of the measures
introduced to improve their efficiency. This Article argues that
the initiatives adopted in order to make parastatals more effi-
cient are inadequate and will not realize the intended objectives
unless the chief executives of parastatals are hired on a competi-
tive basis, given more autonomy and the government is commit-
ted not only to designing performance contracts that set realistic
standards, but also enforcing them strictly. It also contends that
there is a need to streamline the multiple regulations that gov-
ern parastatals and reform the corporate regulatory framework
of the private sector in order to raise standards of corporate gov-
ernance and, as a result, ensure that the privatized services are
managed prudently.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Theoretical Framework
Parastatals were first established in Kenya by the colonial
government to provide services that were not provided by the
private sector. 2 They control key sectors such as agricultural ex-
ports, transport and communications, manufacturing and agri-
cultural trade." The government exercises immense control
over parastatals, as it has powers to appoint directors and issue
directives of a general nature.14 The need for privatization is
11. The Privatization Act, (2005) Cap. 2 § 10. (Kenya).
12. See GROSH, supra note 3, at 11.
13. See id. at 1.
14. For example, Legal Notice No. 59 of February 25, 1987 exempted parastatals
including the Kenya Commercial Bank, the National Bank of Kenya, the Kenya Na-
tional Assurance, and the Kenya Re-Insurance Corporation.
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attributable to the failure of the State, as an owner of enter-
prises, to motivate the firms to realize competitive business stan-
dards.15 However, it is notable that most parastatals were not set
up to make profits and, as such, profit maximization ought not
to be the sole basis for measuring their efficiency.16 Although
profits can be realized from privatization of public services, the
resultant social cost borne by the public is often enormous. For
instance, the privatization of water services in Ghana in 2000 re-
sulted in the price of water rising by ninety-five percent which
was beyond the reach of the poor. 7 South Africa experienced
an outbreak of cholera in 2000 when water services were priva-
tized."i In Kenya, the privatization of water services has resulted
in the private sector concentrating its services in urban areas
where sales and profits are guaranteed.19 Privatization has also
resulted in labor layoffs, insecurity and an increment of tempo-
rary and casual labor.20 Although such policies affect the stan-
dards of living of the public and violate their socio-economic
rights, neo-classical economists21 argue that such measures are
justifiable because the net gain from them is greater than the net
lOSS. 2 2 The benefits gained by shareholders are seen to outweigh
15. See Saul Estrin, State Ownership, Corporate Governance and Privatisation, in CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE, STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES AND PRIVATISATION 11 (Org. Econ. Co-
operation & Dev. ("OECD") ed., 1998).
16. Opponents of privatization argue that social welfare ought not to be measured
in exclusively economic terms. See Cass Sunstein, Well-Being and the State, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1303, 1304 (1994).
17. See Sara Grusky, Privatization Tidal Wave: IMF/World Bank Water Policies and the
Price Paid by the Poor, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR (2001), available at http://www.multi
nationalmonitor.org/mm2001/Olseptember/sepOlcorp2.html.
18. See Ginger Thompson, Water Tap Often Shut to South Africa Poor, N.Y. TIMES, May
29, 2003, at Al.
19. See Change Water Act to Encourage Investors, DAILY NATION (Kenya), May 16, 2003.
20. Between 2000 and 2003, 40,000 civil servants and 20,000 employees of paras-
tatals (including public universities) were retrenched. See KENYAN SOC. WATCH COAL.,
PRIVATIZATION: THE STARK REALITIES OF AN IDEOLOGICAL ORTHODOXY, http://www.
socwatch.org.uy/en/informesNacionales/175.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
21. This term is used interchangeably with economic contractarian theorists. See
generally DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); RICH-
ARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986); Armen Alchian & Harold Dem-
setz, The Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations, 62 Am. ECON. REV. 777
(1972); Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Frank Easter-
brook & Daniel Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L. & ECON. 425 (1993);
Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs,
and Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
22. This is referred to as the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See generally John Hicks, The
20071
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the losses suffered by workers and other stakeholders and the
transaction is therefore considered to be efficient because those
who gain can compensate the losers and still remain better off.
23
The failure to measure performance by profitability is re-
garded by neo-classical law and economics theorists as the main
cause of the inefficiency of parastatals, as it deprives them of the
incentive to increase gains, cut costs, and operate efficiently.24 It
is for this reason that proponents of the neo-classical law and
economics theory regard privatization as a requirement for
achieving a free capitalist market economy and as the best way to
enhance operational efficiency because the need to increase in-
dividual gains or wealth maximization in a free market results in
efficiency and therefore contributes to the general social welfare
and economic benefits. 25 The competition and efficiency arising
from privatization is justified on the basis that it leads to the bet-
ter provision of services at a lower cost and therefore enhances
the enjoyment of socio-economic rights. 26
On the other hand, opponents of privatization are of the
view that it does not lead to enhanced efficiency and economic
growth because privatization often leads to the creation of mo-
nopolies, as parastatals are often sold to a few rich individuals or
foreign investors. Although the inequality resulting from the
concentration of resources in the hands of a few individuals has
been justified on the basis that people are inherently unequal, 27
it clearly renders services expensive and beyond the reach of the
poor and thus contravenes the non-contententious constitu-
tional reform measures that Kenya seeks to adopt and which
guarantee the provision of basic public services, such as water,
housing, sanitation, social security and freedom from hunger.28
Valuation of the Social Income, 7 ECONOMICA 105 (1940); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Proposi-
tions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 EcoN. J. 549 (1939).
23. See Hicks, supra note 22, at 111; Kaldor, supra note 22, at 550.
24. See Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, Socio-Economic Rights and Privatization of Basic
Services in South Africa: A Theoretical Framework, 4 ECON. Soc. RIGHTS REv. 1, 3 (2003).
25. They also regard the capitalist system as the best method of promoting the
general welfare because it is the most efficient economic system. See, e.g. GARY BECKER,
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3-14 (1976); RICHARD POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE 353 (1990).
26. See Chirwa, supra note 24, at 3.
27. John Rawls has argued that the inequality may be used to benefit the least
advantaged members of the society. SeeJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJusTICE 7-10 (1999).
28. See Draft Constitution, arts. 60-65 (2004) (Kenya), available at http://kenya.
rcbowen.com/constitution/chapS.html#70; see also Godfrey Odongo, Socio-economic
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It is true to observe that state ownership of parastatals might be
in the best interest of the public, even when some of them are
not as efficient as businesses in the private sector. 29
Neo-classical economists regard a company as a unit for all
bargaining arrangements which the participants in a company
seek to use with a view to maximizing wealth through beneficial
bargains. ° According to them, all participants in a company
enter into contracts with corporate management. It is these con-
tracts which stipulate the extent of their claims against the assets
of the company. 1 The firm is, therefore, seen as a "nexus of
contracts" where the board of directors, being the agent for
shareholders, purchases managerial services and monitors the
implementation of managerial policies and performances. 2
The relationship between the participants in a company is
usually characterized by conflicts of interests.33 For instance,
conflicts may arise while disbursing dividends or financial losses,
allocating responsibility for the performance of tasks, and deter-
mining the level of care and skill expected from directors. Con-
tractarian theorists analyze these conflicts from an economic
perspective, and thus maintain that an agency relationship arises
when one individual relies on another. 4 In such a scenario the
person undertaking the duties is the agent and the affected party
is the principal. The principal incurs agency costs when the
agent fails to act in the best interests of the principal. To reduce
agency costs, the principal may opt to incur monitoring costs
with a view to ensuring that the agent acts in the best interests of
the principal. 5 According to contractarians, there is an agency
relationship between shareholders and directors because the
principal (shareholder) engages another person (director) "to
Rights in the Draft Constitution of Kenya: Prospects for Their Judicial Enforcement, Community
Law Centre, 6 ECON. Soc. RIGHTS REV. 1, 6-7.
29. Developed countries also limit foreign investment in some industries, such as
airline and telecommunications, which are considered risky to be in the hands of for-
eigners.
30. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 21, at 3-9.
31. See id. at 9.
32. See Eugene Fama & Michael Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L.
& EcoN. 301, 302-11 (1983).
33. See George Stigler, The Economics of Conflict ofInterest, 75J. POL. ECON. 100, 101
(1967).
34. This concept is referred to as the "agency cost." SeeJensen & Meckling, supra
note 21, at 5.
35. See id.
2007]
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perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating
some decision-making authority to the agent."3 6 Given that
shareholders rely on directors to run a company efficiently in
order to derive profits, any misconduct on the part of directors
imposes agency costs on shareholders."
The poor performance of the board of directors of paras-
tatals has been attributed to the existence of multiple agents.38
Unlike a private company, which has a single principal (share-
holders) and agent (managers), a parastatal is governed by mul-
tiple agents, namely managers and the state or public officials.
Voters who elect public officials are considered to be the princi-
pals of both the board of directors and the State. Inefficiency of
the boards of parastatals arises because the agents (public offi-
cials) who have the powers to appoint board members and issue
managerial directives do not always act in the best interest of
parastatals, but in the interest of voters who can vote them out.39
B. The Impact of Parastatals on the Kenyan Economy
Kenya's Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") growth rate of
more than five percent in 2005 is a great improvement from the
negative GDP growth rates it has had in the past.4 ° In the past,
the poor state of the economy has contributed to the country's
heavy dependency on international lending agencies.4' Despite
this dependency, the continuous structural adjustment of the ex-
tension of credit to the country by the donor agencies has had
little impact on the economy of Kenya.42 Increasing internal
debts have reduced the creditworthiness of the country and, in-
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. See Jim Brumby & Michael Hyndman, State Owned Enterprise Governance: Focus
on Economic Efficiency, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES AND
PRIVATISATION, supra note 15, at 33, 38-41.
39. See id. at 38-41.
40. It had a 2.4% growth rate in 2000. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT
REPORT: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS 232 (2002), available at http://www.
worldbank.org/wdr/2001/.
41. See generally CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2004, available
at http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html.
42. By November 2000, Kenya's external debt had increased from UK£16.2 million
at the end of 1998 to UKf93.6 million. In 1998, the World Bank's Operations Evalua-
tion Department said only slightly more than half of its projects in Kenya were satisfac-
tory. See Peter Okong'o, An Economy at War with Itself, E. AFR. STANDARD (Kenya), Apr.
25, 2001, at 1.
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deed, debts owed by parastatals have paralyzed operations of
some local creditors.43 For example, in 2001, Reli Co-operative
Savings and Credit Society sought the help of the government to
recover 591 million Kenyan shillings from the Kenya Railways
Corporation (a parastatal)." Similarly, another parastatal, the
Tana River and Athi River Development Authority ("TARDA"),
which was on the verge of insolvency at that time, also sought the
assistance of the government to recover debts owed to it by an-
other parastatal, the Kenya Power and Lighting Company.45
Although parastatals accounted for about eleven percent of
GDP between 1986 to 1990, they were responsible for a net out-
flow of three billion Kenyan shillings, equivalent to 0.9% of GDP
in 1991, from the central government.4 6 As a result of such
debts, international lending agencies have been urging the gov-
ernment to privatize parastatals in order to reduce public spend-
ing and improve their general performance.47
To reverse the deteriorating performance of parastatals, the
government sought to increase the role of the private sector in
order to foster dynamic economic growth. The belief that re-
sources are likely to be used more efficiently if they are trans-
ferred to the private sector led the government to adopt a priva-
tization program.48 Although the program had started with the
idea of reducing state spending and enforcing market discipline,
some investors have been reluctant to conduct business in Kenya
and, indeed, some have, in the past, relocated their enterprise
away from the country due to the poor prospects of economic
43. According to the World Investment Report by the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") for the year 2001, the foreign direct invest-
ment flows to sub-Saharan Africa decreased from UK£5.6 billion in 1999 to UK£4.6
billion in 2000. See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2001:
PROMOTING LINKAGES 20 (2001). Other factors contributing to lack of foreign invest-
ment are: slow pace in privatizing parastatals, general bureaucracy, bad infrastructure,
crime, high power tariffs, heavy duties, and regulatory constraints. Some companies,
such as Pfizer and Johnson &Johnson, cited some of these reasons as contributing to
their decisions to depart from Kenya. See Daniel Akoko & Ogova Ondego, Pfizer to Pull
Out of Kenya, DAILY NATION (Kenya), Sept. 6, 2001, at 1-2.
44. See Margaret Were, Arrest Warrant for KR boss, E. AFR. STANDARD (Kenya), Feb. 6,
2002, at 10.
45. See Biketi Kikechi, Tarda on Verge of Collapse, E. AFR. STANDARD (Kenya), June
27, 2001, at 12.
46. See INST. OF ECON. AFFAIRS, PROMOTING COMPETITIVENESS & EFFICIENCY IN KENYA
15 (2002).
47. See Tread Softly on Parastatals, supra note 10.
48. See id.; Were, supra note 44, at 30.
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improvement.49 However, the change of government in 2002
and the willingness of the current government to tackle corrup-
tion and adopt other economic reforms have led to an increase
in the number of investors willing to invest in Kenya.5 ° Thus, the
reforms being undertaken are likely to improve governance and
attract investment given that investors are not likely to be at-
tracted to countries without stable economic and regulatory sys-
tems.
C. Development of Parastatals
As stated earlier, parastatals were first established in Kenya
by the colonial government on the understanding that they
would be the most appropriate mechanism for providing services
that were not provided by the private sector.5 In addition, it was
felt that public enterprises were better placed to curb the ex-
ploitation of consumers. 2 Infrastructural services, such as ports,
railways, airlines, post and telecommunications fell into this cate-
gory. Crop marketing boards were also established by settler
farmers with a view to marketing their produce.5 3 The majority
of them resembled co-operatives to a large extent because they
had grower representation on the boards of directors.
Before independence, the colonial government adopted
the Swynnerton Plan in order to develop a group of progressive
middle-class African farmers. As a result, the marketing boards
that existed were reorganized to serve large numbers of smal-
49. According to the UNCTAD World Investment Report for 2001, Kenya is
among the ten countries with the highest rate of foreign direct investment outflows in
Africa. See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., supra note 43, at 22. According to the re-
port, South Africa, Angola, Egypt, Nigeria, and Tunisia attracted investment because of
primary extraction, political stability, suitable environment for investment, labor costs,
skills, technological advancement, and infrastructure. See Ellud Miring'uh, Foreign Direct
Investment to Africa Drops, E. AFR. STANDARD (Kenya), Sept. 19, 2001, at 13.
50. See Cathy Majtenyi, Kenyan President Unveils Plan to Attract Investors, VoicE AM.
NEWS, Mar. 24, 2004.
51. By 1990, the parastatal sector had 255 firms, which employed 115,000 people.
Their wage bill represented forty percent of the public sector and twenty-two percent of
the national wage bill. See SRI INT'L, supra note 1, at v.
52. See GROSH, supra note 3, at 11.
53. For instance, the Land and Agicultural Board was established in 1931 to pro-
vide credit to settler farmers. Other boards included the Agricultural Regulatory and
Commodity'Boards, which were mainly established in the 1940s and 1950s for the pur-
poses of marketing and regulating their respective markets. See SRI INT'L, supra note 1,
at v.
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lholders.5" Additional boards, such as the Cotton Lint and Seed
Marketing Board and the Kenya Tea Development Authority,
were created to cater for the expansion.55
Given that most Africans were peasant farmers, agricultural
workers in settlers' plantations, and workers in the state sector,
the government sought to finance their agricultural, commer-
cial, and industrial entrepreneurship through Development Fi-
nance Institutions (parastatals). These included: the Agricul-
tural Finance Corporation of Kenya ("AFC"), the Industrial and
Commercial Development Corporation ("ICDC"), and the In-
dustrial Development Bank ("IDB"). Although these parastatals
were all successful in the 1960s and 1970s, some, such as the
AFC, started experiencing liquidity problems when politically
connected farmers, with large farms, took loans with insufficient
collateral and continuously defaulted on payments. 56
After independence, the Kenyan government established
similar parastatals with the intention of providing services of a
monopolistic nature, Africanizing the sector, and redistributing
regional income.57 As such, the growth of parastatals in Kenya
can be attributed to economic as well as social and political
objectives. 58 Given that there was a shortage of local entrepre-
neurs with adequate capital and skills at independence, the gov-
ernment considered it necessary to be involved both directly and
indirectly in the economy rather than relying on foreign capi-
tal. 59 This enabled the government to play the role of entrepre-
neur through the medium of parastatals. For example, the Ke-
nya Industrial Estate and the ICDC were established to assist lo-
cal entrepreneurs to increase their participation in the industrial
54. See GROSH, supra note 3, at 13.
55. See id.
56. On November 20, 2001 unsecured loans owed to the Agricultural Finance Cor-
poration of Kenya ("AFC") were two billion Kenyan shillings. See Government to Write off
AFC Debt, E. AFR. STANDARD (Kenya), Nov. 20, 2001.
57. By the 1980s there were 223 parastatals, which increased to 255 by 1990. By
2001, they had been reduced to 207. Of the 255 in 1990, the government was a major-
ity shareholder in 135 and minority shareholder in 120. Parastatals established between
1963 and 1978 included the Development Finance Corporation, the Agricultural Fi-
nance Corporation, the Agriculture Development Corporation, the Maize and Produce
Board, the Kenya Industrial Estates, the National Bank of Kenya, the Transport Licens-
ing Board, and the Kenya Reinsurance Board. See GROSH, supra note 3, at 12.
58. See SRI INr'L, supra note 1, at 5.
59. See id.
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sector.60 The Kenyan government deemed it necessary to estab-
lish more parastatals in order to facilitate development in sectors
which were not attractive to private investors. Such sectors often
carried higher investment risks or low returns and, therefore,
did not attract investors unless the government reduced risks by
participating in joint ventures.
After independence, most foreign investors were wary of in-
vesting in Kenya due to the risk of nationalization.6' As a result,
they required the government to be a joint partner in most ven-
tures, which the government agreed to so as to attract foreign
capital, technology, and management skills.6 2
Although nationalization of the existing parastatals was not
the main objective of the government, most parastatals created
after independence assisted in the Africanization of the econ-
omy." The main players were firms that provided credit and
technical assistance. Such firms helped Africans enter com-
merce. These included: the Kenya National Trading Corpora-
tion ("KNTC") that helped in development of farms, the ICDC,
and the National Construction Corporation ("NCC") that
helped local people enter the construction industry.6 4
Since the government pursued a mixed economic strategy
which allowed both the public65 and private66 sectors to supple-
ment each other, it had a commitment to promoting rapid
growth, "equitable distribution of incomes, more balanced equi-
60. See id.
61. See id. at 6.
62. To protect foreign investors, the government enacted the Foreign Investment
Act in 1964, which encouraged government shareholding in joint ventures with private
partners. See id.
63. See id. at 6-7.
64. See SRI INT'L, supra note 1, at 8.
65. It was considered essential for the government to participate in the economy
in order to create sensitive controls for the proper utilization of resources. Govern-
ment participation in the economy was also used as a means of diffusing ownership to
the public. This was the case in the large enterprises such as General Motors, Associ-
ated Vehicle Assemblers ("AVA"), Kenya Textile Mills ("KTM"), Kenya Breweries Ltd.
and Leyland Motors. See REP. OF KENYA, AFRICAN SOCIALISM AND ITS APPLICATION TO
PLANNING IN KENYA 6 (1965).
66. The creation of a private sector with unrestricted rights was considered a dan-
ger as it could lead to the division of the society along class lines. To prevent the
growth of private monopolies, the government created parastatals dealing with whole-
sale trade, such as the Kenya National Trading Corporation ("KNTC") and Uchumi
Supermarkets. See id. at 12-13.
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table distribution of industries, 67 creation of employment oppor-
tunities, and the need to supply certain goods and services con-
sidered essential to the people."6 By participating in the econ-
omy, the Kenyan government sought to control various
economic sub-sectors by, for instance, conserving the scarce pub-
lic capital resources and offering services at low costs to consum-
ers and producers. This was done with a view to achieving Afri-
can socialism goals, seeking to give political equality, social jus-
tice, and human dignity to all.69 However, the difficulty in
balancing all these interests prompted the government to issue
guidelines outlining how it would implement its policies. It ob-
served thus:
The most important of these policies is to provide a firm basis
for rapid economic growth. Other immediate problems such
as Africanization of the economy, education, unemployment,
welfare services, and provincial policies must be handled in
ways that will notjeopardise growth. The only permanent so-
lution to all of these problems rests on rapid growth. If
growth is given up in order to reduce unemployment, a grow-
ing population will quickly demonstrate how false the policy
is; if Africanization is undertaken at the expense of growth,
our reward will be a falling standard of living. 70
The government refrained from adopting nationalization poli-
cies because of the fear that the process would impede the crea-
tion of new assets, absorb state funds, and contribute to the
flight of private capital.7 ' It was considered that high growth
needed higher capital formation that could not be financed
through domestic savings alone.
The expansion of parastatals in the 1960s and 1970s illus-
trates how crucial the parastatal sector was in the development
67. The government got involved in industries that were considered to be finda-
mental to industrial development. Sectors regarded as fundamental to the economy
included: textiles, chemical and pharmaceutical, mining and construction, machinery
and equipment, agro-processing, tourism, finance and banking, electricity and water,
and transport and communication. Development finance institutions, such as the De-
velopment Finance Corporation and the Industrial and Commercial Development Cor-
poration, were earmarked to help in the establishment of basic industries. They were
also supposed to offer professional advice as well as financial assistance to African entre-
preneurs venturing into commercial enterprises.
68. See SRI INr'L, supra note 1, at 6-7.
69. See id. at 7.
70. REP. OF KENYA, supra note 65, at 18.
71. See id. at 26.
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process of the economy. However, their role seems to have
changed by the late 1970s and, in turn, the international lending
agencies, among other interest groups, started questioning their
viability. As a result, Presidential Committees were set up in
1979 and 1982 to investigate the financing of parastatals and
they found considerable flaws, including the lack of productivity
and increasing foreign ownership and control of key sectors of
the economy. 7
2
D. Classification of Parastatals
Parastatals can be divided into four categories, namely:
* Utilities: These are monopolies, which have little or no com-
petition from the private sector.73
* Regulatory parastatals: These are semi-monopolies with spe-
cific roles to play. Such roles may involve the development of
a sub-sector, regulation of production and prices,74 and mar-
keting by the private sector.75
* Commercial or industrial parastatals: These engage in active
competition with the private sector.
* Development finance parastatals: These facilitate industrial
development and the participation of Kenya nationals in the
economy. They achieve this objective by providing funds to
industrial and commercial concerns.76
E. The Legal Framework
The majority of commercially-oriented parastatals are incor-
porated under the Companies Act of 1978 ("Companies Act") 77
72. See REP. OF KENYA, supra note 4, at 42.
73. These include the Kenya Ports Authority, the Kenya Power and Lighting Com-
pany, Kenya Railways, and the Kenya Post and Telecommunication Corporation.
74. The Electricity Regulatory Board is endowed with the responsibility of setting
consumer prices for electricity.
75. The Cotton Board, for instance, regulates the cotton sub-sector. Others in-
clude the National Cereals and Production Board, the Kenya Meat Commission and the
Kenya Tea Development Authority.
76. They include the Industrial Development Bank Ltd., the Industrial and Com-
mercial Development Corporation, and the Development Finance Company of Kenya.
77. The Companies Act regulates all companies that are formed or registered
under it-this may include companies that are limited by shares or by guarantee and
parastatals that are registered under the act. See The Companies Act, (1978) Cap. 486
(Kenya); see also The State Corporations Act, (1986) Cap. 446 § 2(c). (Kenya). On the
other hand the State Corporations Act regulates the parastatals in which the govern-
ment is the majority shareholder. See The State Corporations Act § 2(c). (Kenya).
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Others, especially utilities and commercial regulatory bodies, are
incorporated under specific enabling legislation. 7' All paras-
tatals, in which the government has controlling equity interests,
either directly or through public institutions, are governed by
the State Corporations Act of 1986 ("SCA"). 79 However, the
President has the power to exempt a state corporation from any
or all of the provisions of the SCA.8° Similarly, the nature of
business of a parastatal sometimes necessitates its exemption
from the provisions of the SCA. For instance, being involved in
financial market dealings may be a reason for exemption, as
some measure of confidentiality may be required in order to at-
tract customers who would otherwise be wary of their financial
secrets being made public. 81 Although such parastatals are ac-
corded a large measure of autonomy, they are not entirely free
from government intervention.
Under the SCA, a parastatal can be established as either a
statutory corporation or a company.82 Parastatals that are estab-
lished as statutory corporations are not registered under the
SCA.83 However, parastatals that are established as ordinary
companies are registered under the Companies Act and are sub-
ject to it to the extent that it does not conflict with the SCA.84
As opposed to a statutory corporation, the division of pow-
ers of parastatal companies is similar to that of private compa-
nies established under the SCA. Parastatal companies have, sub-
ject to the provisions of SCA, all the powers and privileges of a
natural person. Their power flows from the statute creating
them and the SCA.85 Although statutory corporations have all
the powers of a natural person, both the statutes establishing
them and ministerial directions sometimes limit their powers.
The SCA vests the power of appointing a board of directors
in the President and the Minister.86 The President is also em-
powered to "give directions of a general or specific nature to a
78. See, e.g., The Export Processing Zones Act, (1993) Cap. 517, §3. (Kenya) (estab-
lishing the Export Processing Zones Authority).
79. See generally The State Corporations Act § 2. (Kenya).
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. § 3(2).
86. See id. § 6(1). The President appoints the Chairperson. Id. at §6(1)(a). The
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board with regard to the better exercise and performance of the
functions of the state corporation and the board shall give effect
to those directions. ' 7
II. REASONS FOR POOR PERFORMANCE
A. Supplementing the Private Sector
One of the reasons for the poor performance of parastatals
is the fact that the objective of some parastatals, as set out by the
Kenyan government, is to foster private sector activity rather
than their own growth."8 This often results in conflicts of objec-
tives and can be regarded as a source of inefficiency. The need
to assist the private sector partly undermines the efficiency and
solvency of parastatals, as the need to have high profits is rarely
on the agenda of some parastatals.89 For instance, despite being
nearly half-owned by individuals and institutions, Kenya Power
and Lighting has continued to perform mandatory social roles,
such as the rural electrification program.90 Since such paras-
tatals hardly compete with the private sector, they lose the bene-
fits that can accrue from competition. The Hilmer Report on
National Competition Policy has recognized the need to allow
such competition and it has recommended that:
Markets within the state must not be unnecessarily distorted;
each GOC [Government Owned Corporation] must when-
ever possible compete on equal terms with the private sector
and to that end any special advantage or disadvantage of the
GOC because of its public ownership or its market power
must be removed, minimised or at least made apparent;
where a GOC has excessive market power there may be a
need for structural reform to increase competition and spe-
cial monitoring may be necessary to prevent market abuse.9"
minister appoints the chief executive and other members of the board. See id. at
§ 6(1)(b)-(e).
87. See id. § 7(1).
88. See GROSH, supra note 3, at 16.
89. See id.
90. On May 10, 2001, the government owned 55.08% of the company's shares. See
Muna Wahome, The Paradox of Money Owed KPLC, DAILY NATION (Kenya), Nov. 20, 2001.
91. See Darryl McDonough, Corporate Governance and Government Owned Corporations
in Queensland, 10 BOND L. REv. 272, 289 (1998).
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B. Appointment of Directors
The SCA gives the President a strong measure of control
over appointments. It allows the President to provide for the
management of every public corporation established under the
SCA.9 2 The President is also empowered to determine the com-
position of the board of directors. 3
Generally, a board of directors in a parastatal consists of:
* Chairman appointed by the President
* Chief Executive
* The Permanent Secretary of the parent Ministry
* The Permanent Secretary of the Treasury
* Less than seven other members who are not employees of the
state corporation. Three of these are required to be public
officers, appointed by the Minister.94
Due to the political nature of appointments, parastatal
boards are composed of many directors who are ex-civil servants
with little or no private business experience.95 As the Daily Na-
tion notes:
In this country, as in the rest of Africa, people seek political
power, not to implement programmes or ideologies, but to
hand out benefits in the form of jobs and lucrative contracts
to their relations and political allies. And, what we call politi-
cal parties here are institutions, which are bereft of program-
mes and ideologies. They are mere patronage structures or-
ganised by the elite of various ethnic communities for the
purposes of capturing state resources for members of their
ethnic communities.96
The appointment of directors by the President and the Ministers
politicizes directorships. The directors, who sometimes serve
concurrently as nominated Members of Parliament and Assistant
Ministers, act in the interests of their appointers rather than the
corporation. From an economic perspective, it is true to say that
the performance of directors of parastatals is constrained by the
many agency problems that arise from their political appoint-
ments. Although the directors are appointed by the State, the
92. See The State Corporations Act, (1986) Cap. 446 §§ 3, 6. (Kenya).
93. See id. § 6.
94. See id. § 6(1).
95. See SRI I,'L, supra note 1, at 119.
96. Jaindi Kisero, Political Patronage Mother of Graft, DAILY NATION (Kenya), Aug. 1,
2001.
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State is not the principal because it derives its mandate from the
voters. As a result, both the State and the directors are agents of
the voters. This makes it difficult for directors to act in the best
interests of parastatals because the State sometimes requires
them to pursue political interests in order to meet the expecta-
tions of a strategic element of the electorate. This explains why
ministerial powers are often used to further political motives,
such as enhancing the image of a political party. Indeed, in
2000 the interference in the operations of the National Bank of
Kenya by directors who were political appointees led the Central
Bank of Kenya to intervene and abolish the post of Executive
Chairman in finance parastatals.97
Irregular appointment of directors has attracted both local
and foreign criticism. For instance, the Parliamentary Public In-
vestment Committee in 2000 urged the Attorney General to in-
troduce legislation that would empower Parliament to vet the
appointment of parastatal directors.9" Similarly, the appoint-
ment of some three board members to the membership of the
Electric Regulatory Board was challenged in 2001 by the World
Bank for not meeting the requirements of the Electric Power
Act. The World Bank was concerned with the fact that the gov-
ernment ignored the autonomy of the board and removed one
of the directors who had vowed to run the company in accor-
dance with the Electric Power Act rather than the SCA.99
The poor and ineffective management of parastatals can be
attributed, partly, to the appointment criteria, which is based on
political influence rather than relevant technical expertise. This
has had detrimental effects on the managerial capacity of the
boards and on the morale of competent staff.1"' Given that Ke-
nya adopts subjective standards to assess directors' culpability, t 'O
the courts are bound to consider the individual circumstances of
directors while assessing liability. As such, a vast majority of di-
rectors are likely to escape liability for breach of their duties of
97. See Banks to Get Rid of Executive Chairmen, DAiLy NATION (Kenya), Mar. 3, 2000.
98. See Aggrey Ouma, Age Limit for the Heads of Parastatals, E. AFR. STANDARD (Ke-
nya), July 28, 2000, at 2.
99. Prior to this the government had removed and replaced the entire board arbi-
trarily. See Hussein Mohammed, World Bank Queries Status of ERB, E. AnR. STANDARD
(Kenya), July 28, 2001, at 1-2.
100. See SRI INT'L, supra note 1, at 119.
101. See generally Flagship Carriers Ltd. v. Imperial Bank Ltd., (1999) L.L.R. 6
(H.C.K.) (Kenya).
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skill and care. The appointment of qualified persons would en-
hance the performance of the boards by raising the standard of
care expected from directors.
C. Remuneration
The implementation of the Ndegwa Committee of 1979 saw
the setting of maximum salaries for chief executives. As a result
of this review, some wage employees, because of union affilia-
tion, were able to earn higher salaries than the lower cadre of
managers supervising them. °2 Such discrepancy, coupled with
the setting of salaries of top parastatal executives by the Office of
the President, has contributed to lack of managerial motivation,
especially in finance parastatals where competition with the vi-
brant better-paying private sector is intense.10 3
Additionally, in the past, remuneration has been based on a
classification system that classifies all parastatals into six catego-
ries from A to F. Although the classification is supposed to rank
parastatals according to their importance, it is generally believed
that the real classification depends on the closeness of the chief
executive to the government. Where a chief executive enjoys a
particularly good relationship with the government, his paras-
tatal is likely to be given a higher ranking, even when it does not
deserve it.104 Apart from affecting the motivation of directors,
low remuneration discourages them from observing strict busi-
ness ethics.' 0 5
In order to curb the effects of poor remuneration on pro-
ductivity, the Kenyan government has increased the salaries of
directors and introduced one-year performance contracts,10 6
102. See generally PRIVATE SECTOR CORP. Gov. TRUST, STUDY OF CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE IN PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AND STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES (Discussion Draft 2001),
available at http://www.ccg.or.ke/reports/SOE.doc.
103. See GROSH, supra note 3, at 167.
104. See SRI INT'L, supra note 1, at 49-50.
105. The research conducted by SRI International established that the managers
of the Industrial Development Bank ("IDB") felt that their terms of service should have
corresponded with that of Kenya Commercial Bank ("KCB"). Although both firms are
parastatals it was not possible for the directors to have equal pay due to categorisation
of IDB as a state corporation and the exemption of KCB from the State Corporation
Act. Id. at 50.
106. Under performance contracts, directors of parastatals enter into agreements
with the government whereby they promise to achieve set targets within a particular
period and, on the other hand, the government promises to award a bonus or give
other incentives when the targets are met. See Mary M. Shirley & Lixin C. Xu, The Empir-
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which are renewable if the individual performance of a director
is satisfactory." 7 Although this initiative appears to be a prudent
step, it is unlikely to improve productivity because some of the
directors who are expected to meet the targets agreed upon with
the government lack the managerial capacity to perform effi-
ciently, as they were hired on the basis of their close ties with
public officials rather than on merit. They are therefore likely to
continue enjoying political protection and it might thus be diffi-
cult to remove them from office even when they do not meet the
targets set under performance contracts.1"8
In addition, the initiative is unlikely to go as far as expected
unless employees are also motivated and boards of directors are
given more autonomy. Indeed, research has shown that poorly
implemented performance contracts do not improve the per-
formance of parastatals. A study conducted by Shirley and Xu1 9
in 1997 to investigate the effectiveness of performance contracts
in China indicated that they did not on average improve produc-
tivity. Whilst rewarding managers with higher incentives was
seen as a factor that improved productivity,1" 0 most contracts
failed to enhance efficiency because they had poor provisions
which set the performance targets too low. It was also estab-
lished that managers were not committed because they were able
to bargain down the targets set by the government. In addition,
the government was reluctant to include provisions that would
introduce reforms that were likely to prejudice workers, as doing
so could weaken their political support bases.11' This shows that
performance contracts are unlikely to yield good results in Ke-
nya as well; unless they are properly designed, the government is
committed to enforcing them, and the directors are hired on
merit and given more autonomy. Safeguards are also needed to
ensure that directors do not manipulate the information that is
ical Effects of Peqformance Contracts: Evidence From China, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 168, 168-
192 (2001).
107. Basic salaries have risen from a maximum of 250,000 Kenyan shillings per
month to 800,000 Kenyan shillings a month. See Parastatal Chiefs Sign Job Contracts, DAILY
NATION (Kenya), Dec. 22, 2004; Revealed: Shim-a-Month Pay Deal for State Executives,
DAILY NATION (Kenya), Dec. 21, 2004.
108. See SRI INT'L, supra note 1, at 49.
109. See Shirley & Xu, supra note 106, at 193.
110. See id. at 191.
111. See id. at 193-94.
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available to them in order to reflect positive growth of parastatals
and, as a result, avoid removal from their offices.
D. Lack of Autonomy
While the Ndegwa Committee of 1979 attributed no respon-
sibility to the central government for the poor financial perform-
ance of parastatals, the 1982 Working Party on Government and
Expenditure associated many of the financial problems with cen-
tral government control.1 12 However, it offered only a few sug-
gestions. It particularly castigated the presence of public enter-
prises in strictly commercial sectors. It observed that in a com-
petitive sector such presence might prejudice the financial
stability of parastatals. The Working Party recommended that
"the Government should not direct a parastatal to carry out pol-
icy related activities which might not be financially sound with-
out providing explicit subsidies for those activities." '13
The Committee, however, favored their involvement in sec-
tors serving important social functions. It is worth noting that
the attempts made by the Ndegwa Committee and the 1982
Working Party on Government and Expenditure were not very
effective in reforming parastatals. This view was supported by
eighty-five percent of the respondents who took part in a survey
conducted by the author in 2001 in Nairobi." 4
Since the board of directors. 5 is made responsible for the
proper management of the affairs of parastatals, it is accountable
for funds and responsible for the financial business and the
management of the parastatal11 6 However, unlike private com-
panies, the ultimate internal control of parastatals lies in the gov-
ernment. The government performs the role of the general
112. See generally PRIVATE SECTOR CORP. Gov. TRUST, supra note 102.
113. See REP. OF KENYA, supra note 4, at 42.
114. See Kiarie Mwaura, Regulation of Directors in Kenya: An Empirical Study, 13 INT'L
Co. & COMM. L. REV. 465, 476 (2002).
115. See The State Corporations Act, (1986) Cap. 446 § 6. (Kenya). The number
of board members, ranging from six to sixteen, and composition of the board, varies
among parastatals. Although the board of directors has private sector representatives,
the management role of private representatives is undermined by the heavy govern-
ment presence. Section 6 of the State Corporations Act provides that the number of
directors should be eleven, of which at least four should be private sector representa-
tives, unless the specific enabling statute provides otherwise. See id.
116. See id. § 15(1).
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meeting by appointing directors and issuing directives.1" 7
The Inspector of State Corporations plays an important role
in the running of parastatals, as he has the duty of advising the
government on all matters affecting the effective running of
state corporations. He is also obliged to report to the Minister in
respect of management practices within any corporation and to
report, to the Controller and Auditor General (Corporations),
any cases where moneys appropriated by Parliament are not be-
ing applied by the state corporation for the purposes for which
they were appropriated.'18 Upon conclusion of investigations,
the Inspector has powers to disallow any item of account that is
contrary to the law or to any direction lawfully given to a state
corporation. He can also surcharge the amount of any expendi-
ture on the person responsible for incurring the expenditure. 9
The State Corporations Act 1986 entitles a person aggrieved
by the decision of the Inspector to appeal to the State Corpora-
tion Appeal Tribunal. The Tribunal may confirm, vary, or quash
the decision of the Inspector and subsequently remit the case to
the Inspector with such directions as the Tribunal thinks fit. Ap-
peals from Tribunal decisions lie in the High Court.1 2 ° The fair-
ness of decisions arrived at in the Tribunal are questionable, as
the Tribunal is comprised of a chairman who is appointed by the
President and two other members appointed by the Minister. 2 '
Since the State Corporations Act does not impose any limit
on the ability of Ministers to direct the board, the board of direc-
tors is not able to question or review undesirable directions.
Ministers are also not under any obligation to adopt sound cor-
porate governance practices. 12 2 As such, the position of paras-
tatal directors differs from that of their counterparts in the pri-
117. See generally R. W. James & S. Ligunya, Organizational Relationships and the Con-
trol of Parastatals in Tanzania, 5 E. AFR. L. REv. 39 (1972).
118. See The State Corporations Act, (1986) Cap. 446 § 18(1). (Kenya).
119. See id. § 19(1).
120. See id. § 21. It is worth noting that the Tribunal has never been constituted
since the State Corporations Act 1986 came into force. Similarly, the State Corpora-
tions Advisory Committee, which is meant to administer the law, has never been cre-
ated. SeeJaindi Kisero, Corporations Act Has Outlived Its Usefulness, DAILY NATION (Kenya),
May 30, 2001.
121. See The State Corporations Act § 22. (Kenya). Although the Law Society of
Kenya and the Institute of Certified Public Accountants are required to nominate min-
isterial appointments, the appointment of the chairman is not subject to such require-
ments. See id.
122. See id. §§ 22-23.
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vate sector. For instance, parastatal directors may escape liability
for considering the interests of the government rather than
those of the corporation or the wider community. With such a
structure in place, the governance of parastatals can hardly be
appropriate, as directors are more likely to act in the interests of
the government. 123
To reinforce transparency in the exercise of ministerial
powers, the State of Queensland in Australia requires the publi-
cation of any ministerial decision affecting Government Owned
Corporations ("GOCs") .124 The State therefore has an impor-
tant role to play in the control of GOCs. However, directors of
GOCs have the power to make decisions regarding the use of
resources. In fact, the corporatization process has sought to en-
sure that external controls placed on GOCs are only limited to
matters involving major strategic issues. 125
The GOCs are subject to two systems of governance, namely
the Westminster political system and the laws governing corpora-
tions. In monitoring GOCs, therefore, Parliament adopts similar
checks and balances as it does on the executive and legislature
for strategic decisions. 126 This makes the GOCs more accounta-
ble than Kenyan parastatals. It is notable that without reinforc-
ing accountability, parastatals can hardly be expected to be prof-
itable. As Hessel notes, "[t]o run a business [enterprise], man-
agement must be accorded ample power to manage, but to run
it effectively, it must be held accountable for the use of this
power. ' 127 Although parastatals do not have autonomy, some,
such as Kenya Power and Lighting, manage to remain in busi-
ness due to lack of competition and heavy tariff protection,121
subsidies, and other special privileges. These privileges, in turn,
make it impossible for other companies to compete effectively
123. See id. § 19(4).
124. See McDonough, supra note 91, at 310. The GOCs share similarities with
Kenyan parastatals because they were established to bring about micro-economic re-
form in the State. In effect, they are meant to improve the "[s] ate's overall economic
performance and the ability of the government to achieve social objectives through
improving the efficiency, effectiveness, and the accountability of COCs." Id.
125. See id. at 285.
126. See id. at 289.
127. See Marek P. Hessel, How Corporate Governance Makes Privatization Succeed,
EcoN. REFORM TODAY 25, No. 4, 1995.
128. See Martin Mutua et al., Sack All Top KPLC Bosses, E. AFR. STANDARD (Kenya),
Nov. 6, 2001. Kenya Power and Lighting Company charges the highest electricity tariffs
in Africa. See id.
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with parastatals. In fact, most of the seed companies in Kenya
have already sought liberalization of the seed sector in order to
end the monopoly of the Kenya Seed Company. 129
E. Overlapping Regulations
Parastatals are subject to overlapping regulations. For in-
stance, although all directors and chief executives of the Com-
munications Commission of Kenya ("CCK") are appointees of
the minister under the Kenya Communications Act,13 CCK is
still governed by the State Corporations Act 1986 because it is a
state corporation. As such, the President is empowered by the
State Corporation Act to appoint the chief executives.
Additionally, parastatals are subject to direct regulation by
Parliament. 1 ' Parliament scrutinizes them under the legislation
that establishes them. In most cases, the government exercises
control of parastatals through ministers. Since all state corpora-
tions fall under a ministry, a minister has powers to give direc-
tions of a general character to the organization. Such directions
may, for instance, be in relation to matters affecting a national
interest; in such a situation, a minister shall determine what con-
stitutes a national interest. Unlike private companies, where a
board of directors sets the objectives of the company, the minis-
ters are responsible for identifying such objectives in parastatals.
They are bestowed with the responsibility of setting both com-
mercial and non-commercial objectives. The parastatal board
must answer to the ministers who are in turn accountable to Par-
liament. As such, accountability of directors is limited to the fi-
nancial performance of parastatals. 13 2
Additionally, excessive regulations, coupled with extensive
ministerial intervention in the functioning of the boards, tend to
impair their ability to make commercially sound decisions. Para-
statals, including the ones with specific enabling legislation, are
required to: 1) report directly to the parent ministry because
129. See Tabitha Onyinge, Companies Demand Liberalisation, DAILY NATION (Kenya),
Sept. 20, 2001.
130. See generally The Communications Act, (1998) § 6. (Kenya). Section 6 (a) and
(b) of the Kenya Communications Act 1998 empowers the President to appoint the
chairman and the Minister to appoint the directors. The Kenya Communications Act
establishes the Communications Commission of Kenya. See id. § 3.
131. See The State Corporations Act, (1986) Cap. 446 § 18. (Kenya).
132. See id. § 15(1).
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the ministry, in conjunction with the Treasury, must approve
parastatal establishment and the remuneration system; 2) obtain
budget and investment approval from the Treasury; and 3) jus-
tify their accounts before the Public Accounts Committee of Par-
liament. 133 Also, parastatals are subject to review by the State
Corporations Advisory, the Controller, the Auditor-General, and
the Inspector-General (Corporations).134
The numerous approval requirements have the overall ef-
fect of constraining the ability of directors to make commercial
decisions and to recruit and retain skilled staff. Moreover, the
expediency of the decision-making process is also rendered inef-
fective by requirements of ministerial approval. For example, a
minister, in consultation with the State Corporations Advisory
Committee, has to give approval for the employment of a chief
executive. 135 The delay in obtaining such approvals is one of the
main reasons parastatals are unable to make strategic deci-
sions. 1 36 As such, the process impacts negatively on the general
operational performance of parastatals.
The chief executive of a parastatal may be summoned by the
Public Investments Committee to answer, on behalf of the
board, any question arising from the report submitted to that
Committee by the Controller and the Auditor-General.137
F. Fraudulent Transactions
Service on the board of a parastatal poses a heightened risk
of conflicting interests for directors due to the excessive control
exerted by political actors. Due to this control, directors of para-
statals must take extra precautions to ensure they act in the in-
terests of the company. For instance, duties towards parastatals
that are public enterprises are made more onerous because of
133. See SRI INT'L, supra note 1, at 47-48. Borrowing by parastatals must be sanc-
tioned by the Treasury. See id.
134. See The State Corporations Act § 18. (Kenya).
135. See id. § 5(3).
136. See SRI INT'L, supra note 1, at 48-49. Borrowing of money can only be exer-
cised with the consent of the Minister. Remuneration and reward system at the paras-
tatal must be approved by the Minister, Treasury, State Corporations Advisory Commit-
tee and the Inspector-General (Corporations). A survey of twelve pararastals conducted
in October 1991 indicated that delays in obtaining investment decisions extended to
over nine months. In other cases, such as the contentious issue of restructuring paras-
tatals, decision takes more than two years. See id.
137. See The State Corporations Act § 15(2). (Kenya).
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their involvement in price fixing. For some commodities, prices
are kept artificially low either to counter inflation or to make
some necessities affordable to consumers. Conversely, prices are
set to protect "inefficient enterprises or provide resources for
cross-subsidization.' 138
Most of the problems identified by the Ndegwa Committee
continue to effect parastatals. For instance, in August 2001, the
Parliamentary Public Investment Committee revealed how direc-
tors of the National Social Security Fund abdicated their duties
when they awarded themselves executive treats. As a result, the
parastatal lost three billion Kenyan shillings (US$55 million) be-
tween 1996 and 1998. Similarly, the Kenya Ports Authority paid
allowances to board members above the approved rates. Instead
of the approved 1,000 Kenyan shillings per session, board mem-
bers were paid between 5,000 and 10,000 Kenyan shillings per
session. 139
In addition, the Inspector-General (Corporations) declared
the National Housing Corporation ("NHC") insolvent because
of mismanagement. The directors had commissioned real estate
projects worth 319 million Kenyan shillings without either com-
petitive bidding or approval of the NHC board of directors. The
NHC also lost sixty-nine million Kenyan shillings when the man-
aging director deposited the money into the now-collapsed Pru-
dential Bank, despite opposition by the finance director and a
Treasury directive requiring parastatal surplus funds to be in-
vested in Treasury Bills and Bonds.a4 °
G. Conditions Imposed by International Lending Agencies
In order to restore the confidence of investors and foster
high economic growth, the IMF has advised Kenya to implement
measures to address problems of governance, the pursuit of
macroeconomics policies, and the acceleration of structural re-
forms such as privatization."' However, the privatization pro-
138. See GROSH, supra note 3, at 8.
139. See Catherine Gicheru, MPs Watchdog Finds More State Looting, DAILY NATION
(Kenya), Aug. 16, 2001.
140. See id.
141. See Peter Munaita, We Shall Not Ease Pressure, IMF Tells Kenya, E. AFR. STANDARD
(Kenya), Oct. 22, 2001 (noting that international lenders have halted US$300 million
in aid due to Kenya's failure to pass anti-corruption legislation); Promise the IM Any-
thing, E. AFR. STANDARD (Kenya),July 14, 1999 (observing that the IMF has made con-
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gram has contributed to the collapse of many parastatals. The
structural adjustment loans offered by donor agencies have
sometimes expressly required governments to privatize paras-
tatals.14 2 Failure to comply with the donor conditions results in
withdrawal of aid and loans. The use of such conditions is illus-
trated by the comments made in 1985 by then-U.S. Secretary of
State, George Schultz, requesting that United States Agency for
International Development ("USAID") officials raise certain is-
sues with less developed countries ("LDCs"):
Policy dialogue should be used to encourage LDCs to follow
free market principles and to move away from government
intervention in the economy... to the maximum extent prac-
tical governments should rely on the market mechanism-on
private enterprise and market forces .... Parastatals are gen-
erally an inefficient way of doing business .... In most cases,
public sector firms should be privatized.' 43
Similarly, while announcing resumption of assistance to Kenya
in 2000, the IMF board set tough new conditions, which Kenya
accepted as part of the aid agreement.144 Unfortunately, before
these conditions were imposed, the IMF suspended financial aid
to Kenya in July 1997 as a result of the government's failure to
act on high-level corruption and follow key governance crite-
ria.'45 The IMF's suspension of aid sparked the withdrawal of
other donors, resulting in increased interest rates and a pullout
tinued aid to Kenya contingent upon civil-service reforms, privatization of some paras-
tatals, and transparency with regard to public finances); Mbatau wa Ngai, Shareholders
Say No to Board Nominees, E. AFR. STANDARD (Kenya), May 5-12, 1999 (noting that IMF
forced permanent secretary of Treasury to resign following US$104.4 million drug pro-
curement scandal).
142. See generally Abdul Paliwala, Privatization in Developing Countries: The Govern-
ance Issue, 1 L. Soc. JusT. & GLOBAL DEV. J. 2 (2000). Privatization was prescribed as a
condition in seventy-four World Bank loans during 1980 to 1989. See id.
143. NASSAu ADAMS, WORLDS APART: THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE AND THE INTERNA-
TIONAL SYSTEM 169-70 (1993).
144. See Peter Munaita, Did We Sell Our Soul to Get Aid from the IMF?, DAILY NATION
(Kenya), Aug. 3, 2000. Some of the conditions included: weekly inspection of the Cen-
tral Bank balance sheet by Fund officials in Washington, privatizing Kenya Commercial
Bank, and seeking approval of the IMF and World Bank before any new project is intro-
duced during the financial year. By agreeing to the conditions, the government has
been criticized for selling "away the country's sovereignty for a song." Id.
145. See Robert Wanyonyi, Netherlands Stops Funding Projects, E. AsR. STANDARD (Ke-
nya), Sept. 19, 2001. The government of Netherlands also stopped funding environ-
mental projects in Kenya when the Kenyan Parliament rejected the Kenya Anti-Corrup-
tion Authority ("KACA") Bill. See id.
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of foreign investments in Kenya. 14 6
The pressure to privatize prompts the IMF and World Bank
to offer loans with restraints on the public budget; this limitation
reduces public investment that contributes to the indebtedness
of the government to parastatals.141 In general, the policies of
the international lending agencies have not been effective in
helping the country to improve the governance of institutions
and reduce poverty. 4 8 While some measures, such as privatiza-
tion, may reduce the intervention of the government in the
economy, it is not entirely certain that corporate governance
would necessarily improve, since private entities can be as ineffi-
cient as state corporations.
IV. PARASTATAL POLICY REFORM
A lack of autonomy in a board of directors impacts nega-
tively on its effectiveness, as an independent board is key to ap-
propriate corporate governance. To assess how effective the
parastatal boards are in discharging their responsibilities, it is
important to consider what the functions of an effective board
ought to be.
Similarly, the above functions have been recommended by
the Capital Markets Authority of Kenya as being integral to pru-
dent management of publicly listed companies. 149 With these
functions in mind, it can be seen that the boards of directors in
Kenya are not responsible for setting parastatals' goals, as the
function is the responsibility of ministers. The President-not
the board of directors-appoints chief executives. The board's
inability to do so renders the task of imposing performance
levels and sanctions difficult. 5 ° Similarly, the lack of powers to
impose sanctions on the chief executive and other senior execu-
tives limits the ability of parastatals to meet their goals.
146. See Washington Akumu, How IMF Will Pump in Funds, DAILY NATION (Kenya),
July 29, 2000.
147. See generally U.N. MILLENNIUM PROJECT, INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTI-
CAL PLAN TO ACHIEVE THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 193-210 (2005).
148. See id. The U.N. has criticized the policies of the international lending agen-
cies for not being compliant with the Millennium Development Goals' approach to
poverty reduction. See id.
149. See CAP. MKTS. AUTH., GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES BY
PUBLIC LISTED COMPANIES IN KENYA 482-83 (2002).
150. See WORLD BANK, BUREAUCRATS IN BUSINESS: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP 15 (1995).
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Directors of parastatals are not able to perform efficiently
because the government does not practice effective corporate
governance. As a result, it is true to say that "directors are ap-
pointed to a position that carries with it all of the liabilities but
are not given the power to carry out the roles that the law im-
poses. " "'
This demonstrates the difficulty faced by directors of paras-
tatals when performing their duties. The overall inability of di-
rectors to perform efficiently leads to lax cost control, poor qual-
ity of financial statements, inadequate management information
systems, and insufficient plant management and quality con-
trol. 15
2
In general, the regulation of parastatal directors can hardly
be as efficient as that of the private sector due to the govern-
ment's intervention. While public companies have sharehold-
ers153 that can buy and sell shares and monitor the activities of a
company, the ownership of parastatals by the general public is
virtually compulsory by the payment of taxes which help finance
the operations of parastatals. Therefore, since the wider com-
munity does not buy or sell shares as a reaction to the effective-
ness of management, they can only exercise indirect control of
parastatals through the ballot box at a general election.1 54 Apart
from the inability of shareholders to scrutinize parastatals due to
a lack of trading in their equity, other factors that deprive paras-
tatals of the vital scrutiny by shareholders include the inability of
shareholders to remove directors of parastatals and the lack of
analysis of operations of parastatals by external analysts, such as
stockbrokers.
155
A. Steps Initiated by the Government
Although past government policy statements156 have em-
phasized the need to reform the parastatal sector, the govern-
151. See McDonough, supra note 91, at 310.
152. See SRI INT'L, supra note 1, at 100.
153. See Paliwala, supra note 142, at 2. Property rights theorists attribute the poor
performance of parastatals to a lack of individual stakes in the assets of the enterprises.
See id.
154. See McDonough, supra note 91, at 294.
155. See id. at 288.
156. See MBuI WAGACHA, ANALYSIS OF LIBERALIZATION OF THE TRADE AND EXCHANGE
REGIME IN KENYA SINCE 1980 5-9 (2000).
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ment did little towards this end until 1985 when it established
the office of the Auditor General (Corporations) in order to
tighten the control of the financial resources of parastatals by
reviewing the enterprises speedily. 157 Similarly, the government
sought to enhance investigative and supervisory powers of the
Inspectorate of State Corporations Advisory Committee by pass-
ing the State Corporations Act in 1986. The State Corporations
Act 1986 sought to permit parastatal directors to make indepen-
dent decisions, to hire staff and chief executives, and to deter-
mine their wages. 151
As a result of the success of the privatization programs in
other countries, in 1991, the government sought to privatize the
commercial parastatals, close failing parastatals, and reform or
restructure the essential utilities and strategic parastatals. 159 At
this time, privatization of public utilities had been successfully
carried out in other countries such as the United Kingdom,
under the direction of Margaret Thatcher. 6 ° Apart from in-
creasing efficiency, privatization in the United Kingdom at-
tracted public interest in state corporations. 6  It is notable that
ninety-one percent of the respondents who took part in a survey
conducted in 2001 in Nairobi took the view that privatization of
parastatals in Kenya would improve accountability and produc-
tivity.
1 6 2
While this measure may partly reduce the adverse impact on
the economy, it is doubtful whether privatization is the only ap-
propriate step for Kenya to take, given that management and
157. See AFR. DEV. FUND, COUNTRY GOVERNANCE PROFILE 5 (2004).
158. See The State Corporations Act, (1986) Cap. 446 § 27. (Kenya). Other institu-
tions established to facilitate reform included the Parastatal Review Committee, which
was established in the 1980s to review the performance and problems affecting all the
parastatals in the country.
159. See Gerrishon K. Ikiara et al., Kenya: Formulation and Implementation of Strategic
Trade and Industrial Policies in the Politics of Trade, in THE POLITICS OF TRADE AND INDUS-
TRIAL POLICY IN AFRcCA: FORCED CONSENSUS? 205-25 (Charles C. Soludo et al. eds.,
2004).
160. See SRI INT'L, supra note 1, at 73. Much of the public enterprise output came
from state enterprises in telecommunications, gas, electricity, water, rail transport, and
postal services. See id.
161. See Chiara Gratton-Lavoie, Essays on Privatization, Ch. 3, table 2 (June 6,
2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univer-
sity), available at http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-09182000-19510041/
unrestricted/Chapter3.PDF. After Amersham International was offered for sale in
1982, it subsequently made a pre-tax profit of UK£22 million in 1987. See id.
162. See Mwaura, supra note 114, at 476.
[Vol. 31:34
THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
operational constraints are not the only factors affecting paras-
tatals. Indeed, without effective regulation of directors, private
enterprises can be equally inefficient.
Past attempts to reform parastatals in Kenya emphasized the
strengthening of control mechanisms. For instance, in 1992, fol-
lowing negotiations with the World Bank, the Minister for Fi-
nance attempted to introduce in Parliament three bills which
would have allowed the Treasury to take over control of paras-
tatals from the Office of the President. The Treasury was meant
to exercise its powers in parastatals as a shareholder, delegating
powers to the directors in order for the corporate structure to be
similar to that of the private sector. They also sought to curb the
excessive powers of the State Corporations Act 1986 by abolish-
ing the office of the Inspectorate of State Corporations. How-
ever, the government rejected the Bills before they were debated
in Parliament, as they undermined presidential powers to ap-
point directors.'63
Recent attempts to enhance the performance of parastatals
have favored partial privatization. The government has sought to
implement a comprehensive parastatal reform program, which
includes the privatization of all non-strategic parastatal enter-
prises and the rehabilitation and reform of all strategic enter-
prises. 16  The objectives behind the reform program include:
1) reduction of the financial and administrative burden that
parastatals impose on the government; 2) increasing efficiency
through an improvement of the enabling environment for the
private sector; 3) raising government revenue from privatization
sales and liquidations; and 4) eliminating preferential treatment
to allow a level playing field for the private sector. 165
B. Privatization Bottlenecks
Although the poor performance of parastatals, coupled with
pressure exerted by the donor community and the Kenyan pri-
163. See Jaindi Kisero, Leakey ReJects Plea to Exempt Telkom from Act, DAILY NATION
(Kenya), Sept. 12, 2000.
164. See REP. OF KENYA, supra note 4, at 42. The 1982 Working Party on Govern-
ment and Expenditure recommended the privatization of parastatals capable of being
well managed by the private sector and the liquidation of non-viable parastatals. See id.
165. See generally Gov. OF KENYA, KENYA'S PARASTATAL REFORM PROGRAM (1991)
(presented for discussion to the Consultative Group Meeting of Kenya's donors in
Paris).
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vate sector to have parastatals privatized, has increased, it might
take a long time to finalize the process of privatization due to
constraints, such as: 1) the reluctance of the government 66 to
sell or give up profitable enterprises, 167 placing a high priority
on unprofitable parastatals which do not attract buyers; 2) oppo-
sition from employees arising from fear of retrenchment;1 6 ' 3)
intellectual ideologies against privatization;1 6' 4) a narrow field
of qualified buyers; 5) a lack of developed capital markets; 70 6)
a lack of necessary expertise to support the process;17 7) a lack
of transparency in the divestiture program;172 and 8) an uncer-
tain investment climate.1 7 ' Also, parastatals structured as mixed
joint stock companies in Kenya contain certain restrictions about
the transferability of all or certain classes of shares and provide
preemptive rights to existing shareholders, with which share-
holders must comply. 174 Besides, the Privatization Act of 2005
166. See SRI INT'L, supra note 1, at 69. By 1991, the Parastatal Reform Policy Com-
mittee had made the decision to privatize 139 non-strategic parastatals. A survey con-
ducted by SRI International on privatization plans indicated that the manufacturing
company executives were supportive of the privatization plans. Some of them, however,
doubted whether the government was committed to implementing the reforms fully.
See id.
167. See Tom Mogusu, Privatization Delays Due to Lack of Political Will, E. AFR. STAN-
DARD (Kenya), Sept. 11, 2001. The Nairobi Stock Exchange Chief Executive, Kibuga
Kariithi, recently attributed the delay in the privatization of Telkom and Mumias com-
panies to lack of political will. See id.
168. See generally INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP, WORLD BANK, INDUSTRIAL RE-
ORIENTATION IN EAST AFRICA (2003), available at http://lnwebl8.worldbank.org/oed/
oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/588204F63DOAAC14852567F5005D8869.
169. See Ernest Harsch, Privatization Shifts Gears in Africa, AR. RECOVERY, Apr. 2000,
at 8.
170. See MBUI WAGACHA, KENYA'S CAPITAL MARKET: To LIST OR NOT To LIST 1-2
(2001).
171. See Government Scraps Reform Body, DALY NATION (Kenya), Sept. 26, 2000. In
2000, the government virtually scrapped the Executive Secretariat and Technical Unit
("ESTU") which used to regulate the parastatal reform program in Kenya. The unit is
now comprised of only two people. It was scrapped as a result of pressure from donors,
most of whom preferred to have advisers from the World Bank rather than local ones.
As a result of the lack of expertise, some institutions, such as the Mumias Sugar Com-
pany, Chemelil Sugar Company, and Kenya Reinsurance Corporation, have managed
their own privatization. See id.
172. See Harsch, supra note 169, at 16-17.
173. See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2005 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 357 (2005); see also CHRISTOPHER BLArMAN ET AL., KENYA:
ENHANCING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF KENYA'S MANUFACTURING SECTOR: THE ROLE OF
THE INVESTMENT CLIMATE 62-64 (2004).
174. See The Companies Act, (1978) Cap. 486 § 74(1). (Kenya). Section 74(1) of
the Companies Act states that holders of not less, in the aggregate, than fifteen percent
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seems to favor commercialization of public services rather than
entire privatization of parastatals. In addition, the utilities-
which are likely to be retained in the long run because they are
profitable-will still have a sizeable amount of shares owned by
the government.175 These obstacles will take time to overcome;
meanwhile, parastatals will continue to exist in the Kenyan mar-
ket.
Miscreant directors may continue to benefit from paras-
tatals as a result of the lack of adequate safeguards assisting in
the privatization process. 76 At present, there is no law dealing
with sensitive privatization issues, such as the valuation of paras-
tatals, the procedure for selecting buyers, the use of specific sale
techniques, the financing of share purchases, and the allocation
of privatization process. 177 The current government had halted
further privatization until a law to guide the process was en-
acted. 17  This was a step in the right direction because, prior to
this initiative, there was nothing to prohibit concentration of
ownership of privatized state assets in the hands of well-con-
nected individuals and multinational corporations, 79 hence cre-
ating monopolies that do not improve the services previously
provided by parastatals.1 80 For example, the acquisition of East
Kenya Bottlers by a South African company, Coca-Cola Sabco,
and the plans to acquire two other companies were criticized by
the President in 2001 for giving Coca-Cola Sabco a seventy per-
cent stake in the entire carbonated soft drinks market, contrary
to the monopoly laws.'
In the past, it was not possible to safeguard shareholders'
of the issued shares of a special class of shares may apply to court to have the variation
cancelled if they did not consent to or vote in favor of the resolution of variation. See id.
175. See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 173, at 354.
176. SeeJaindi Kisero, Privatisation Law is What Kenya Needs, DAILY NATION (Kenya),
Jan. 10, 2001.
177. See generally Saulo Wanambisi Busolo, Transparency Required in the Privatisation
of the Sugar Industry, E. AFR. STANDARD (Kenya), Oct. 16, 2001.
178. See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 173, at 355-56.
179. See Kisero, supra note 176.
180. Few indigenous Kenyans have bought the privatized firms to date. See Poul
Ove Pedersen & Dorothy McCormick, African Business Systems in a Globalising World, 37J.
MOD. AFR. STUD. 109, 114-15 (1999); see also Anna Gelpern & Malcolm Harrison, Ideol-
ogy, Practice and Performance in Privatization: A Case Study of Argentina, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J.
240, 252 (1992) (discussing similar problems in Argentina).
181. See generally Mutahi Mureithi, Okemo, Kijirah in Dilemma, FIN. STANDARD (Nig.),
Sept. 4, 2001.
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and employees' rights to buy shares in parastatals as politicians
manipulated the program." 2 The following transactions illus-
trate such manipulation: 1) the free take-over of National Mill-
ing Corporation by the Premier Flour Mills of Nakuru; 2) the
selling of Kericho Tea Hotel to MS Sololo Investments for a pal-
try fifteen million Kenya shillings (US$225,129); and 3) the sell-
ing to politicians of Golf Hotel of Kakamega, Kisumu Sunset Ho-
tel, Homa Bay Hotel, and Marsabit Hotel. 8 3
Although the Privatization Act of 2005 has some positive as-
pects that seek to streamline the process of privatization, it con-
centrates too much power in the hands of the Minister for Fi-
nance, as he is given the powers to appoint the Executive Direc-
tor of the Privatization Commission, " 4 which has the exclusive
power to administer the Privatization Fund.18 5 The Appoint-
ment of the Executive Director ought to be subjected to parlia-
mentary scrutiny in the same manner as the appointment of
other commissioners of the Privatization Commission so as to
ensure that the Executive Director does not owe allegiance to
the minister.
C. Private Sector Versus Parastatals
Corporate governance in the private sector differs signifi-
cantly from that of parastatals. In the private sector, sanctions
and incentives are used to make directors perform their duties
with a view to maximizing profits."8 6 For instance, the market
for shares is a sanction used against directors in the sense that
shareholders can sell their shares if they are dissatisfied with the
management.18 7 Outside shareholders also provide a sanction
against directors because directors may be dismissed in the event
that a lower share price may lead to a take-over."8 8 In addition,
the threat of insolvency might discipline directors because such
a threat may provide incentives for directors to manage the busi-
ness of a company prudently and, in turn, this will safeguard
182. See generally Kisero, supra note 176.
183. See id.
184. See The Privatization Act, (2005) Cap. 2 § 10. (Kenya).
185. See id.
186. See Estrin, supra note 15, at 14.
187. See id.
188. See id.
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their reputations and jobs. 89 Moreover, the efficiency of a com-
pany may be promoted by rewarding directors with handsome
remuneration when their performance is sound. 9
Although some of the above sanctions may be effective in
some instances, some have limitations. For instance, despite the
possibility of transferring shares by shareholders when they are
dissatisfied with the performance of the management, a transfer
of shares would not be effective if the amount of shares trans-
ferred is not substantial. 191 Indeed, it might be difficult and
costly for shareholders to collect the necessary information that
would enable them to convince other shareholders concerning
the failings of the entity.19 2 Undoubtedly, in the event of such
limitation the prospects of deterring pursuit of personal objec-
tives by the management would be minimal.
The State, as the principal shareholder, contracts with the
management to run parastatals.193 From an economic perspec-
tive, it can be argued that weaknesses in the governance of paras-
tatals arise as a result of a lack of sufficient market incentives and
disciplines.1 94 Unlike the private sector, the public sector does
not have a market for shares imposing sanctions on poorly per-
forming management.9 5 As such, shareholders in parastatals
have no exit options. Given that the market for corporate con-
trol is absent, the parastatal is never under the threat of take-
over; likewise, the board is not under the threat of replacement.
This contributes to the poor performance of the board of direc-
tors due to lack of incentives to perform effectively. In addition,
since parastatals are often bailed out by the State, it can be ar-
gued that the lack of the threat of insolvency also contributes to
weak governance.' 96 This problem is compounded further by
the fact that civil servants are not rewarded as a result of im-
proved performance. The recent initiative by the Kenyan gov-
ernment to hire directors of parastatals on the basis of perform-
ance contracts and to reward them handsomely when they im-
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 15.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 14.
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prove the performance of parastatals 9 7 is likely to boost their
motivation and, in turn, enhance the efficiency of parastatals. It
is notable, however, that the lack of a similar initiative to moti-
vate employees can be a major factor contributing to ineffi-
ciency.
While the private sector has a single principal and agent,
namely the shareholders and the managers, there are multiple
agents in parastatals. Since the State derives its mandate from
the voters, the State and the board of directors are both agents
of the voters. Serious agency problems arise as a result of this
complexity.19 8 For instance, given that politicians are accounta-
ble to voters, they are likely to lose sight of the commercial goals
of a parastatal whilst attempting to please strategic parts of the
electorate. 9 9 The economic efficiency of parastatals is also un-
dermined by the fact that the politicians do not have a personal
equity stake in the entities.20 0 As a result, they have no financial
incentive to ensure parastatals are managed effectively. 21
Due to the fact that public enterprises adopt political set-
tings/policies, it is generally believed that the public nature of
parastatals makes them inherently inefficient and unprofitable
due to inefficient controls.20 2 As a result, there is a popular be-
lief that privatization is a panacea for their inherent problems.
Darryl McDonough addresses the problem of using a state cor-
poration as a means for improving a state's economic perform-
ance:
By creating a hybrid company/statutory corporation the gov-
ernment has left open the issue of corporate governance.
The model does not allow for the directors to act as they
should-as fiduciaries of the organization that they are ap-
pointed to direct. Adopting the corporate structure in the
context of GOCs should mean embracing and applying it
within a government context with all its imperfections. 20 3
The failure to adhere to effective corporate governance can
197. See generally Parastatal Chiefs Sign Job Contracts, DAILY NATION (Kenya), Dec. 22,
2004.
198. See Brumby & Hyndman, supra note 38, at 33.
199. See id. at 40-41.
200. See id. at 41.
201. See id.
202. See YAIR AHARONI, THE EVOLUTION AND MANAGEMENT OF STATE-OWNED ENTER-
PRISES 161-216 (1986) (measuring performance of state-owned enterprises).
203. See McDonough, supra note 91, at 310.
[Vol. 31:34
THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
largely be attributed to the present state of parastatals. Paras-
tatal banks, until very recently, have remained profitable and ef-
ficient despite the presence of competing local and multina-
tional banks and their success can be attributed to being subject
to less influence from the Ministry of Finance, as ministerial in-
fluence has made the business sector so wary of government's
involvement in business. As such, government's attempts to reg-
ulate business are being rejected. For instance, the attempt to
introduce a bill in Parliament that would empower a parastatal,
the Horticultural Crops Development Authority, to regulate2"4
the horticultural sector 205 was opposed by the Fresh Produce Ex-
porters Association of Kenya. The Association claimed that suffi-
cient regulation is already being carried out by the private sector
and that the involvement of government would result in ineffi-
ciency-as observed in other sectors regulated by the govern-
ment such as the tea and coffee industries.
Apart from the strong past performance of parastatal banks,
agricultural parastatals also performed well for two decades after
independence. Being large and complex organizations, they
served large numbers of smallholder farmers.20 6 Although priva-
tizing public utilities might amount to the exploitation of a pub-
lic interest, often guaranteed by parastatals, it can be argued that
the flotation of shares might help ailing parastatals to boost their
efficiency and profitability by raising capital and creating an in-
terest group that would demand transparency and accountabil-
ity. The adoption of this strategy has enabled Kenya Power and
Lighting Company to remain profitable for a long time.20 7 Since
204. See Michael Njuguna, KAM Opposes New Electricity Company Plan, DAILY NATION
(Kenya), Sept. 10, 2001. Similar attempts to create an additional parastatal to manage
rural electrification was opposed by Kenya Association of Manufacturers because it
would have increased production costs of electricity and, in turn, increased electricity
tariffs. See id.
205. See Washington Akumu, Industry Says No to New Law, DAILY NATION (Kenya),
Sept. 7, 2001. The horticultural sector is the second highest foreign exchange earner in
Kenya. Flowers, fruits and vegetable exports earned 14 billion Kenyan shillings in 2000.
See id.
206. See GROSH, supra note 3, at 52.
207. See Mutua, supra note 128. The company is, however, experiencing liquidity
problems and the government has proposed to bail it out. Although the Minister for
Energy maintains that the liquidity problems are not as a result of mismanagement,
opposition Members of Parliament have opposed initiatives to save the company. Most
of the companies' debts were accrued before it was exempted from the 1987 State Cor-
porations Act. In November 2001, the government and related organs owed the com-
pany 3.1 billion Kenyan shillings. See id.
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some parastatals appear to have failed as a result of subsidizing
some class of producers and consumers, the government would
have to stop subsidizing such groups for their performance to
improve. This being the case, the resulting improvement can be
attributed to policy reform rather than privatization per se. It re-
mains true that such policy reform is achievable even without
privatization. Although the privatization of some parastatals has
enhanced their performance, 20 8 privatization can hardly be said
to be an end in itself, as private monopolies have the capacity of
being as inefficient as parastatals in the absence of a strict regula-
tory framework. For instance, the failure to plan effectively
before the liberalization of the Kenya economy has affected
some sectors, such as agriculture. Farmers have attributed the
decline in rice production in the country to the unplanned take-
over of the government schemes. As the Provincial Commis-
sioner of Central Province once stated, "Kenya has managed to
liberalise policy but not practice. When we were under the con-
trolled system, it was easy to blame the Government. Under
liberalisation, there is no one to blame. '202 Thus, it is notable
that protection of some sectors of the economy might be in the
national interests of the country. Such protection might fore-
stall the outward flow of resources, which has been accelerated
by the ownership of privatized companies by foreign compa-
nies.210 Policies designed to protect the national economy of a
country are already being used by a vast majority of countries.
D. The Need to Reform the Corporate Regulatory
Framework of the Private Sector
While privatization can enhance efficiency and profitability,
it is also possible for the process to impact negatively on private
companies' liquidity, labor, and social stability. Indeed, in the
absence of sufficient safeguards, it is not inconceivable that some
imprudent directors might find their way to the boardrooms of
privatized companies. To avoid such an eventuality, the govern-
208. See generally KR to Go Public, DAILY NATION (Kenya), Mar. 15, 2000 (noting
Kenya Airways privatization led to profits instead of further losses for company).
209. See generally Free Market Destabilises Agriculture, DMALV NATION (Kenya), Sept. 25,
2001.
210. Foreign companies own most of the privatized companies because the locals
have limited capital and skills. See How Anglo-Saxons Continue to Enslave Africans, E. ArR.
STANDARD (Kenya), June 3, 2001.
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ment must streamline the privatization process. A lack of trans-
parency in the privatization process increases political and social
costs, as it makes the selection of buyers less efficient and con-
tributes to the loss of public confidence in the process.
For privatization to be successful, there must be a stable cor-
porate governance structure for privatized firms to ensure an ef-
ficient provision of services. The Companies Act, the main regu-
latory framework for companies, is outdated as it is based on the
English Companies Act of 1948.211 For instance, it is not effi-
cient in disqualifying miscreant directors who abuse their fiduci-
ary positions, as it only disqualifies directors who are in breach of
their duties in the course of winding up but not when a company
is a going concern. 2 12 Directors who have been responsible for
the insolvency of several companies in Kenya are also not pre-
cluded from acting as directors,21 3 unless they have been disqual-
ified following bankruptcy 214 or conviction for fraud.215 It is nec-
essary to bar such directors from assuming other directorships
for a specified time in order to safeguard against abuse of com-
panies they might mismanage.
The standard of skill and care expected from company di-
rectors is very low, as a director is not required to give continu-
ous attention to the affairs of the company. Instead, competent
performance by himself or his delegate in periodical board
meetings suffices. 2 16 There is no statutory provision requiring
directors to have expertise and experience in the management
211. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 2006 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT-KE-
NYA, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/2006/62005.htm.
212. See Kiarie Mwaura, Disqualification of Company Directors in Kenya, 54 N. IR. LE-
GAL Q. 118, 125 (2003).
213. See The Companies Act, (1978) Cap. 486 § 323. (Kenya) (imposing personal
liability for debts of company and other liabilities on persons knowingly party to fraud).
214. See id. § 188(1). Under § 189 of the Companies Act, a disqualified director is
precluded from being involved in the management of companies for a period not ex-
ceeding five years. See id. § 189. In England, the Company Directors Disqualification
Act imposes a minimum disqualification of two years and a maximum of fifteen years
for unfit conduct. See The Company Directors Disqualification Act, 1986, c. 46, § 6
(Eng.).
215. See The Companies Act, (1978) Cap. 486 § 189(1). (Kenya). It is an offense
in the U.K for a director of a wound up company, within five years, to be a director or
concerned in the management of a company known by the same name or so similar a
name to suggest an association with the liquidating company. See The Insolvency Act,
1986, c. 45, § 216(3) (Eng.).
216. Courts in other jurisdictions have curbed neglect of duty by finding liability
for non-attendance of board meetings and entrusting delegates to carry out the affairs
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of companies. Instead, directors are expected to exhibit a de-
gree of care and skill that can reasonably be expected from per-
sons of their knowledge and experience. Thus, the courts assess
their liability subjectively217 and take into account the knowl-
edge, skill and experience of directors when considering their
liability. It is, therefore, possible for directors to go unpunished
as a result of negligence arising from their ignorance or inexpe-
rience.218 Having a minimum level of expertise for directors
would raise the standards of skill expected from directors of
privatized enterprises. 219
Another shortcoming of the company law is the fact that
there is no effective enforcement of liability against company di-
rectors, as the company is the only body that is entitled to sue a
miscreant director given that his duties are only owed to the
company. It is possible for directors to escape liability when they
form and control a majority of the shareholders because minor-
ity shareholders are precluded from pursuing enforcement suits
unless the company has been a victim of a fraud or the conduct
complained of is oppressive to the interests of some sharehold-
ers. 220 Thus, minority shareholders of privatized enterprises will
continue to be unprotected unless a statutory provision is en-
acted to enable them to enforce the rights of the company.221
Reform of the company law is also needed in order to facili-
tate the role of the private sector in the provision of social ser-
vices given that this would go some way towards filling the gap
of the company. See generally Bowerman v. Hammer, 250 U.S. 504 (1919); Kavanaugh v.
Gould 223 N.Y. 103 (1918).
217. See Andrew Hicks, Directors'Liability for Management Errors, 110 L. Q. REv. 390,
390 (1994). According to judge Hoffman, "a director who undertakes the management
of the company's properties is expected to have reasonable skill in property manage-
ment, but not in off-shore tax avoidance." See Norman v. Theodore Goddard, [1992]
B.C.C. 14 (U.K.).
218. The application of both the subjective and the objective standards has been
favored in other jurisdictions, as it raises the standards expected from directors. See Re
D'Jan of London Ltd., [1993] B.C.C. 646 (U.K.); Norman v. Theodore Goddard,
[1992] B.C.C. 14 (U.K.).
219. See Kiarie Mwaura, Company Directors' Duty of Skill and Care: A Need for Reform,
24 COMPANY LAw. 283, 287 (2003).
220. See The Companies Act, (1978) Cap. 486 § 211. (Kenya).
221. Courts in other jurisdictions, such as Australia and New Zealand, have shown
the tendency of not applying the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, when it stands in the way of
justice. See generally Foss v. Harbottle, (1843) 2 Hare 461 (Eng.); The Corporations Act,
2001, §§ 236-242 (Austl.); The Companies Act, 1993, § 165 (N.Z.); Thomas v. HW
Thomas Ltd., [1984] 1 N.Z.L.R. 686, 693 (C.A.).
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left after privatization of some services provided by parastatals.
The present corporate law framework is ineffective in this regard
because directors of a company owe duties of good faith to the
company.222 Thus, directors do not have an obligation to take
into consideration the interests of employees or other stakehold-
ers.2 2 ' This position focuses on the narrow interest of members
rather than the long-term interest of the enterprise. It fails to
appreciate that it is for the general benefit of the corporate en-
tity to "consider itself as a citizen with a role to perform in a
social as well as in an economic context. 224
It is apparent that the taking over of public utilities or ser-
vices by private corporations without reforming the regulatory
framework of private companies will not be a panacea to the
managerial problem as envisioned by the Privatization Act 2005.
V. CONCLUSION
The poor performance of parastatals has had adverse effects
on the economy of Kenya. Although the initial objective of hav-
ing parastatals was to foster the development of the private sec-
tor and the provision of public services, the current state of para-
statals' management, and the way that they are regulated, mili-
tate against the attainment of such objectives.
It is clear that the regulatory framework in place is ineffec-
tive. Having been adopted at independence, the framework can
hardly be effective in regulating today's business environment,
which has become sophisticated due to technology and global-
ization. As such, the failure on the part of the government to
adopt workable solutions to resolve inefficiency can only make
the crisis worse.
The overlapping regulations governing parastatals, coupled
222. See Percival v. Wright (1902) 2 Ch. 421 (Austl.). Directors may, however,
stand in a fiduciary relationship to the members if members authorize them to negoti-
ate on their behalf. See Briess v. Woolley (1954) A.C. 333 (U.K.).
223. In Germany, for instance, the duty of directors is broadly expressed to include
employees and the public interest. The U.K Companies Act also obliges directors of a
company to have regard to the interests of company employees. See Companies Act,
1985, c. 6, § 309 (U.K).
224. Although there are no requirements in the Kenya Companies Act for compa-
nies to take into consideration interests of employees, some companies encourage em-
ployees to purchase shares and offer gratuities and medical attention. See PHILIP
THOMAS, PRIrATE ENTERPRISE AND THE EAST AFRICAN CoMPANY 200 (1969); see also The
Companies Act, (1978) Cap. 486. (Kenya).
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with the political appointment of directors, make it difficult to
ensure that there is accountability in the sector, as directors' im-
partiality and integrity are often compromised.
Although it is true to some extent to say that the poor per-
formance of parastatals has been caused by their role in supple-
menting the private sector, poor remuneration, and the policies
of international lending agencies, a vast majority of parastatals
experience liquidity problems as a result of the presidential and
ministerial control of their operations. This results in the paras-
tatals being run, not in the interests of the corporation, but for
political interests. Thus, empowering another independent
body, such as Parliament, to vet the appointment of directors,
can protect the corporation. Given that the arbitrary ministerial
directions play a role in limiting parastatals' powers to pursue
their objectives, requiring ministers to present such directions in
Parliament can also reinforce accountability, as Parliament
would demand accountability and require ministers to adopt
corporate governance practices. Having such an arrangement in
place would facilitate the appointment of qualified persons, and
in turn, enhance the performance of the boards by raising the
standard of care expected from directors.
Given that parastatals are likely to be present in Kenya for a
long time, there is a need to streamline the overlapping regula-
tions in order to give parastatals some autonomy, which would
enable them to meet targets set under the performance con-
tracts they have entered into with the government. Reforming
the regulations relating to appointment in order to ensure that
directors are appointed transparently and on the basis of their
competence, rather than closeness to public officials, is neces-
sary because incompetent directors are unlikely to achieve the
targets set under the performance contracts. Transparency is
also needed in the process of drafting performance contracts in
order to ensure that the targets set by the government are realis-
tic.
Apart from the dire need of streamlining the multiple regu-
lations governing parastatals in order to give them autonomy,
the government also needs to reform the regulatory framework
governing the private sector before it brings into force the Priva-
tization Act of 2005 and starts partial privatization of services be-
cause the failure to do so would defeat the achievements of the
objectives of privatization since the privatized corporations or
[Vol. 31:34
2007] THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 75
services would still be open to abuse. This is because the lack of
effective regulation of directors that occurs in the private sector
is not only mirrored in parastatals, but its detrimental effects are
even more obvious.
